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 2 
Natural law is essential justice, justice itself, the origin and test of all positive laws, and 
the ultimate measure of right and wrong.  It is above all rational, discoverable through 
reason, and therefore justifiable.  
-R.S.White 
 
Stated here are the main tenets of natural law theory, a philosophy that upholds the 
existence of an underlying moral code by which the essential justice of all positive laws are 
measured.  Historically proponents of the philosophy have championed the individual’s right in 
discerning the rationale of legislated positive law.   
The history of this theory dates back to the works of Aristotle and the early forefathers of 
the Christian Church.  The works of these seminal philosophers had a powerful impact on the 
Early Modern period throughout Europe.   The theory of natural law gained a particular 
prominence during this time, because the rights of the individual were increasingly in contention 
with the politics of the state.  Here, natural law theories voiced by Hugo Grotius and Thomas 
Hobbes, among others, figured prominently in the political landscape. A more mysterious figure 
in the natural law movement of the Early Modern period is poet/polemist John Milton, whose 
work on the subject has remained largely unexamined by literary critics.1  The analysis here 
attempts to demystify Milton’s theory of natural law, by examining its predecessors in 
conjunction with a formative literary analysis of Miltonic poetry and prose. 
 
                                                        
1 With some notable exceptions, including: Micheal Komorowski’s article, “Milton’s Natural 
Law: Divorce and Individual Property,” Catherine Gimelli Martin’s “The Phoenix and the 
Crocodile: Milton’s Natural Law Debate with Hobbes Retried in the Tragic Forum of Samson 
Agonistes,” and Glenn A. Loney’s “Milton and Natural Law:  with Particular Reference to the 
Divorce Tracts and De Doctrina Christiana.” 
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AN INTRODUCTION TO MILTON’S NATURAL LAW 
A quote from Milton’s most famous work, Paradise Lost, sets into motion our analysis of 
the author’s theories on natural law.  In its retelling of the biblical book of Genesis, Milton’s epic 
poem reveals a prophecy on the rise of government and the corruption of equality and natural 
law.  The Archangel Michael predicts the appearance of the first Monarch:  
One shall rise 
Of proud ambitious heart, who not content  
With fair equalitie, fraternal state, 
Will arrogate Dominion undeserv'd 
Over his brethren, and quite dispossess 
Concord and law of Nature from the Earth; 
Hunting (and Men not Beasts shall be his game) 
With war and hostile snare such as refuse 
Subjection to his empire tyrannous (xii, 24-32)   
 
As evidenced in this sample of his work, Milton’s literature is inclusive of a theory of natural law 
that upholds the fraternity of the state, while challenging the supremacy of government. As a 
nation on the brink of civil war, Milton’s authorship reflects the sociopolitical tensions between 
citizen and institution that existed in England during the mid-seventeenth century.  
Contextualizing the author’s use of the term natural law, scholar Ernest Sirluck acknowledges 
that within Milton’s literature “a genuine revolution in political theory was taking place, which 
the intellectual habits of the time demanded be expressed in terms of law” (52).  The author’s use 
of natural law theory espouses a “single continuous struggle for liberty” (Sirluck 1).  In a 
moment of reflection in his Defensio Secunda, Milton notices a thread running through his prose 
works that promotes, “three species of liberty which are essential to the happiness of social life—
religious, domestic, and civil” (258).  This is an important structuring principle to Milton’s prose.  
In all of his tracts, the liberty of the individual is at stake in one of these three specific realms.  
This thesis will focus specifically on three of his polemic tracts each corresponding, respectively, 
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to the religious, domestic, and civil realms: The Reason of Church Government U’rgd Against 
the Prelaty, one of Milton’s anti-episcopal tracts, The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, one of 
Milton’s divorce tracts, and the Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, one of Milton’s regicide 
tracts.  In championing the liberties of the individual, each of these tracts takes on a sphere of 
positive state or ecclesiastical law and challenges the institution that has governed the 
individual’s rights.  In each of these instances, whether referenced directly or indirectly, the crux 
of the author’s argumentation actively relies on the theory of natural law. This analysis will 
begin with an exploration of the historical development of natural law theory, then move to a 
consideration of the implications of the theory to Milton’s prose work, and finally end with an 
examination of Thomas Hobbes and his antithetical critique of Milton’s natural law theory.   
 
ARISTOTELIAN LAW 
 As one of the earliest purveyors of moral and political philosophy, many of Aristotle's 
foundational works focus on principles of natural law.  Historians consider these works to be the 
genesis of natural law theory.  In his seminal work Rhetoric, Aristotle argues for the existence of 
a universally binding jurisprudence known as the law of Nature.  As the philosopher states, 
“universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent divines, a 
natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or 
covenant with each other” (Rhetoric 103).  Aristotle’s commentary regarding a binding universal 
law of nature is one of the earliest formulations of natural law theory.   
 While prophetic, Aristotle’s natural law theory is brief and inconclusive.  The seminal 
philosopher seemingly shies away from laying out specific parameters of natural law. In Ethics, 
Aristotle proclaims  “some think that all justice is of this sort [natural law], because that which is 
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by nature is unchangeable…this, however, is not true in this unqualified way, but is true in a 
sense; or rather, with gods it is perhaps not true at all” (Ethics 22).  Aristotle’s commentary here 
hints at a division between the natural law of God and man; later theorists would debate this 
theoretical divide. While early Christian purveyors of natural law would argue for an intellectual 
link between God and man, other philosophers would contend that natural law would exist “non 
esse Deum” (The Law of War and Peace 5), even if God himself did not.  Furthermore, 
Aristotle’s work denies a stable, unchangeable form of natural law.  The inclusion of mutability 
into the legal rhetoric leaves many loopholes.  To argue that all of natural law is changeable is to 
assume that there is no fixed moral premise to the law itself.  Without a binding moral code, 
citizens have no recourse to the unjust laws of the state, leaving governments with the right to 
dictate laws in accordance with their customs and culture.  As a result of the theory’s 
incompleteness, Aristotle’s place in the natural law movement is controversial.  However, in its 
establishment of an external legal system, Aristotle’s commentary sets the groundwork for later 
natural law theory.  
 Throughout the centuries, philosophers, theologians, and political pamphleteers would 
ubiquitously reference Aristotle’s principle, building upon the precepts established in his work. 
The ideology, which binds together the actions of men from independent nations, is a forerunner 
to the international law policies of Hugo Grotius.  Grotius himself is credited by many as a 
forefather of the natural law movement in the Early Modern period, and a major influence on the 
political philosophies of John Milton. 
 Commenting on the Aristotelian place within the natural law movement, Tony Burns 
separates Aristotle’s natural law theory from the subversive politics of later centuries’ 
sociopolitical pundits.  Burns upholds Aristotle’s place as a prominent figure in the natural law 
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movement, but separates the philosopher’s work from later theorists who accessed natural law as 
a “higher, critical standard of justice which individuals might use to evaluate positive law, or the 
customs and conventions of the society in which they live” (96).  Aristotle’s conservative 
philosophy offers “a sophisticated philosophical justification of the customs and traditions 
associated with the constitution of any polis, no matter what they might be” (Burns 105).  Again, 
for Aristotle, natural law exists, but it is subordinate to state law and is perhaps too ethereal to be 
applied materially to the jurisprudence of positive law.  The disunity between Aristotle and later 
natural law theorists is apparent, given the relative conservatism of Aristotle’s 
theories.  Ironically, although Aristotelian natural law theory is more conciliatory than 
revolutionary, later natural law theorists would reference it as precedent.  It therefore offered a 
rhetorically persuasive precedent to support their direct challenges to state authority.  However, 
if the principles of natural law theory had ended with Aristotle, there would be no further reason 
for debate and the work of Milton and other Early Modern polemists would have had little 
rhetorical ground on which to stand.  This would change with the intervention of the Christian 
theologians including St. Thomas Aquinas, whose work established a more solid bond between 
natural law and the intellect of man, and paved the way for the political application of natural 
law theory.   
 
CHRISTIAN NATURAL LAW AND THE WORK OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 
 Thomas Aquinas conceived his Summa Theologica as a summation of Christian theology  
Aquinas meant for this treatise to establish guidelines for the individual to act according to the 
Christian faith.  Importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, the treatise includes an early 
Christian commentary on natural law.  Aquinas’s legal philosophies were based on the premise 
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of an interaction between humanity and the Christian God.  Written in the 13th century, the 
treatise purposefully incorporates the work of philosophers from antiquity, including Aristotle 
and other ancient theorists.  Thus, the Summa Theologica continues to affirm the existence of 
natural law, but contradicts Aristotle in arguing for a consistent natural law based on a fixed 
moral code, accessible to mankind through the human intellect.  This refinement of Aristotle’s 
theory is accomplished through an interpolation of a Christian telos into the natural law dialogue.  
Aquinas comments:  
the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way 
…Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to 
its proper act and end: and this participation… in the rational creature is called the natural 
law. (1823)   
 
Here Aquinas establishes the link between the divine and the human, rational creature.  Unlike 
Aristotle, who conceived of a law that was mysterious and intangible to the human intellect, 
Aquinas and his fellow Christians envisioned a divine providence that allows for a determination 
of natural law through mankind’s rational action. Through Aquinas’s theory of divine 
providence, natural law becomes innately accessible to the human intellect and therefore, 
contrary to Aristotelian theory, an effective measure of positive law. Aquinas’s work establishes 
the importance of Christianity to the development of natural law theory.  Indeed the political 
movements of the Early Modern period would have had very little rhetorical ground upon which 
to stand without the support of the early Christian concept of intellectual divine providence.  
Although theorists Grotius and Hobbes challenge the importance of the Christian deity to their 
natural law models, their rhetoric itself relies upon a notion of divine existence.  So too, Milton’s 
natural law theory is indebted to the influence of Christian philosophy.   
 For Milton and other natural law theorists, the moral corruptibility of human intellect 
creates a barrier to the establishment of a natural law based on reason.  For if reason can be 
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corrupt, so too the individual’s conception of natural law.  Aquinas’s theory accounts for this 
corruption through a retelling of mankind’s historical dismissal of divine providence.  As 
Aquinas recounts, “When man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual 
impulses…the more he deviates from the path of reason…he is likened to the beasts that are led 
by the impulse” (1829).  Here Aquinas connects the voluntary dismissal of divine providence 
with a deliberate movement away from reason. In Aquinas’s theory, the intellectual agency here 
to accept divine providence, allows for man to access natural law based on reason.  Hence, 
Christianity grants mankind intellectual agency in perceiving natural law.  This argument for the 
individual’s agency in denying impulsivity, and actively partaking in moral reasoning, would 
inspire the natural law rhetoric of Early Modern writers Grotius, Hobbes, and particularly 
Milton, whose work often champions the moral reasoning of the individual when faced with 
immoral custom and law.  The Doctrine of Discipline and Divorce, and the Reason of Church 
Government likewise rely on mankind’s agency in denying impulses that are contrary to virtuous 
human action.  
 R.S. White in Natural Law and English Renaissance Literature further examines 
Aquinas’s theory of natural law and its influence on the Early Modern period. White credits 
Aquinas in establishing natural law theory but highlights the lack of specificity in Summa 
Theologica. White notices that,  
we look in vain in Aquinas for lists of what is good and what is evil in practice. 
...By his concentration on the inner logic of natural law and only occasionally on 
what it might mean in individual cases, Aquinas’s theory lays itself open to 
hijacking by opposing groups, conservative and radical, idealistic and skeptical, 
and such appropriations were exactly what happened in later ages. (White 32) 
 
White’s observation not only expresses the vanity in seeking specificity in Aquinas’s theory, but 
also implies that perhaps Aquinas himself thought it vain to include such instructions. The 
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purpose of the doctrine is for Christian instruction, not legal codification.  While Summa 
Theologica emphasizes humanity’s capacity for moral reasoning, like much religious doctrine, it 
leaves its philosophies open to a hijacking by opposing groups. Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law 
builds upon Aristotle’s model in granting authority to the individual in accessing a moral code; 
however, much of the theory still remains incomplete.  As White acknowledges, Aquinas’s work 
does not create a fixed foundation for the incorporation of natural law theory into the politics of 
the state; however, his notions of innate moral reasoning will contribute to later political 
expositions of natural law theory in the works of John Milton and his peers in the Early Modern 
period.  
 
THE NATURAL LAW OF HUGO GROTIUS 
Hugo Grotius has been “often hailed as father of natural law” (Rommen 62), and the title 
is certainly an indication of his stature as a social commentator, and philosopher.  Although the 
moniker is dismissive of earlier figures in the development of natural law theory, a claim can be 
made to Grotius’s hand in politicizing what had previously been a matter of theological and 
philosophical debate.  Inspired by the violent Thirty Years War between European nations, Hugo 
Grotius drafted a treatise on international law entitled De Jure Belli ac Pacis in 1625.  As an 
appeal for an international law governing acts of war between nations, the treatise makes 
numerous references to a natural law theory that inspires a more direct regulation of positive law. 
Grotius’s work makes a purposeful deviation from the work of previous natural law theorists and 
espouses a more forceful approach to the law.  As the text declares that, “In our own time, as in 
the past there is no lack of men who make light of this branch of the law, as if it were nothing but 
an empty name…that for a king or a free city nothing is wrong that is to their advantage...and 
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that nature cannot tell what’s just from unjust” (De Jure Belli ac Pacis 3-4). For Grotius, to make 
light of natural law is to relegate the theory to mere philosophical discourse, thereby discounting 
not only the reality of its premise, but also the importance of its applications.  He argues that 
positive laws should not be put in place simply to uphold what was advantageous to the state, but 
should fulfill the higher purpose of law, which is to distinguish between just and unjust acts.  
According to Grotius’s argument, to deny that natural law is unable to make this determination is 
to discount the importance of its place in the regulation of positive law.  While the work of 
previous natural law theorists such as Aquinas and Aristotle stops short of espousing a 
purposeful legal imposition of natural law, Grotius’s theory goes one step further and begins to 
open the door, philosophically, to a law that operates within the same jurisdiction as the positive 
law of the state.  With this extra step, Grotius lays the seeds of the English Revolution and the 
work of political theorists such as John Milton.  While Grotius never challenges the state in the 
form of a direct political grievance, clearly the work of this philosopher was a necessary step in 
the development of the natural law theory. 
Another important component of Grotius’s natural law theory is the existence and 
importance of “right reason.” The theory of right reason, inherited from antiquity and in line with 
Aquinas’s natural law, assumes that human beings are endowed with an intellectual capability to 
discern the inherit justice of an act or law. Grotius observes that, “the law of nature is a dictate of 
right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational 
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity, and such an act is either 
forbidden or conjoined by the author of nature, God” (The Prolegomena 15).  Grotius observes 
here that while the origins of natural law are founded by the will of God, it is through human 
reason that such laws are perceived.  Consequently, the human mind is predisposed to right 
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reason, which grants the individual the authority to determine the moral baseness of an act, and 
by proxy a law, and thereby accept or reject this act and/or law. This privileging of human reason 
and intellect greatly inspires Milton’s later articulations of natural law theory. Milton would 
argue for human liberty based on a natural law of intellect, in contrast to positive laws of the 
state based on tradition and custom.  While Grotius’s theory was not constructed to contend 
directly with specific state policies, his methodologies contribute to the politicizing of the theory. 
 In continuing the philosophical progression of natural law theory, Grotius’s De Jure Belli 
makes a direct rhetorical move to establish a subordinate relationship between positive law of the 
state and the law of Nature. According to the treatise, “the law of nature requires us to abide by 
our promises and this was the origin of civil laws…since it was necessary that men should have 
some way of binding themselves to one another, and no other natural way can be imagined” (De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis 13).  Grotius’s work here establishes a hierarchy between natural and civil 
law, giving primacy to a law of Nature that enacts civil law as its agent. The boldness of his legal 
argumentation was unprecedented in the natural law philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, 
which were much more cautious, placing natural law below positive law within the legal 
hierarchy.  
 Historically much has been made of Grotius’s natural law theory and its movement 
away from philosophy into more tangible, political applications.  This movement has 
influenced many theories about Grotius’s apparent secularization of natural law.  The 
foundation for these ideas comes from the most famous moment in De Jure Belli in which 
Grotius declares, “And what we have just said would have validity even if we granted what 
cannot be granted without great wickedness, that there is no God, or that he has no care for 
human affairs” (5).  For Grotius, the idea of an existence without God is sheer wickedness; 
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however, this rhetorical move is made here perhaps to separate natural law from its theological 
foundations and to allow for a more nuanced discussion of legal theory.  While Grotius here 
asserts the validity of natural law theory, later scholars and natural law theorists would 
presume a purposeful secularization of natural law by Grotius, famously taking this statement 
out of context.  
Regardless of its interpretation, this statement was a key moment in the development of 
natural law theory, as Grotius moved the discussion away from its theological roots and into a 
more pointedly focused legal theory.  As Paul Sigmund argues, Grotius “separated natural law 
from the theologians in the sense that he used it for a secular purpose, the creation of an 
international legal system, rather than as an adjunct of theological speculation” (62).  
Sigmund realizes the importance of Grotius’s secular purpose to his treatise. The reason would 
appear to be twofold: to create a true international legal system, Grotius has to separate the 
law first from national religious affiliations and secondly from its theological speculations.  
Regardless of its initial intentions, Grotius’s work inspired subsequent interpretations that 
relied more on rational argumentation than on religious affiliation.  Natural law theory itself 
became more of a platform for public debate and less a theological movement towards moral 
principle.  Thus, John Milton’s prose works used natural law theory to argue publically for 
reforms to positive state and ecclesiastical law and not for speculative theological debates. 
   
MILTON’S NATURL LAW PART I: REASON OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT 
Milton’s pamphlet entitled The Reason of Church-government Urg’d against the Prelaty 
documents the author’s public dispute with the national Church of England.  Milton’s argument 
challenges the hierarchal structure of Episcopacy in which an Anglican bishop oversees the 
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interactions of local churches.  Milton believed in a form of church governance that allowed for 
a more decentralized structure headed by the congregation itself.  In his anti-Episcopal tract, 
Milton argues that an unwritten natural law based on reason and virtue rejects the impositions 
of the laws of Anglican Church government.  Milton explains, “tradition they say hath taught 
them that, for the prevention of growing schism, the bishop was heaved above the presbyter. 
And must tradition then ever thus to the world’s end be the perpetual cankerworm to eat out 
God’s commandments?” (779).  For Milton, the argument that church laws prevented schisms 
within the church was disingenuous, and the appointment of bishops to govern the local 
congregations contradicted the commandments of God.  Natural law here is closely tied to a 
scriptural interpretation of virtue and also aligns with earlier natural law theorists.  For Milton, 
natural law and the existence of the divine remain intimately connected.   
This connection is articulated continuously in Milton’s Reason of Church Government.  
Taking its cue from Aquinas, the text strongly asserts the inherent divine nature of natural law 
as found in the Gospel, however, Milton refines the notion of divine intervention and places it 
in direct opposition to church governance.  Milton argues, “that which is thus morall, besides 
what we fetch from those unwritten lawes and Ideas which nature hath ingraven in us, the 
Gospell, as stands with her dignity most…lectures to us from her own authentick hand-
writing… not copies of the borrow’d manusripte of a subservient scrowl” (764).  What is moral 
and just is determined by an independent divine law engraved within the hearts of man. While 
this internal law resides in the physical body, its written form is manifest in the Gospel.  As the 
text asserts here, the divine interpretation of Scripture supersedes the positive laws of the 
church.  While Aquinas’s theory stops at the point of internal intellectual reflection, Milton 
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articulates a revolutionary potential to natural law theory, declaring the unwritten law of the 
Gospel as superior to external law.  
Prior to the Renaissance, natural law theorists had avoided direct political implications, 
however, for theorists of the Early Modern period such as Milton and Grotius, positive law 
was subject to a higher authority. While Grotius introduces a politically minded theory of 
natural law, enacted to deter wartime action, Milton takes Grotius one step further, applying 
the tenets of natural law to criticize specific church policy.  Although Milton’s pamphlet most 
directly concerns religious institutions, the author’s subversive undermining of the positive 
authority of the Church is a step forward in the politics of natural law theory.    
In addition to the subversive use of natural law to challenge church policy, Reason of 
Church Government deviates in other ways from work of previous theorists.  While Aquinas 
believed in the recognition of natural law through discipline and virtue, Milton goes further and 
promotes an exclusivity that had not been considered by earlier theorists.  The author notices,   
it is not for every learned or every wise man…to invent or frame a discipline…but 
it must be of such a one as is a true knower of himselfe, and himselfe in whom 
contemplation and practice, wit, prudence, fortitude…so far is it from those 
wretched projectors…that bescraull their Pampflets every day with new forms of 
government for our Church” (Reason 753).   
 
For Milton, the determination of law is not available to all individuals but only awarded to the 
disciplined few who stand out in “defiance with gaine” (753).  According to this argument, only 
those who possess these righteous characteristics are granted authority to determine natural law.   
Milton’s vision of natural law lends a divisive edge to the theory that was not present 
when the argument was a matter of pure theology and philosophy.  Hence, the politicizing of 
natural law in Milton’s work creates a more acerbic notion of law.  Adding to its divisive 
argumentation, Milton’s tract often displays an overt disdain for those who seek to uphold the 
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authority of the church.  This divisiveness jettisons the conservative and often stoic 
argumentation of previous natural law theorists.  Milton’s work often “defies moderation and 
praises surrender to anger under the aegis of zeal” (Kranidas 2).  Kranidas argues that this zeal is 
particular to Milton himself, however, these pointed arguments were commonplace during the 
Renaissance period.  As William Parker notices, Milton’s aspersions are “not unique; they were 
his heritage as a child of his age; but he took his heritage, unsheathed it, sharpened it, and 
wielded it so enthusiastically that his own contemporaries found his language unusual” (Parker 
61).  Thus, one of Milton’s biggest contributions to previous articulations of natural law theory is 
this stamp of personal defiance that accompanies the author’s prose.  Further, the works of 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and even the contemporary Grotius, are not divisively subversive to the 
standing institutions of the church.  Milton’s vision of natural law does not simply question 
specific church laws, but intimately attacks the legitimacy of church law at its core. Unlike many 
of his contemporaries, Milton’s work would foreshadow the political revolutions of the next 
century that would supplant the rigid legal structure of the European monarchy.  Predating the 
political movements of the Enlightenment, Milton’s work here in Reason of Church Government 
is significant to the development of the potentially radical politics of natural law theory.  
 
MILTON’S NATURL LAW PART II: DOCTRINE AND DISCIPLINE OF DIVORCE 
Milton takes a more direct approach in arguing for his theory of natural law in Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce, addressing his pamphlet to Parliament and the Westminster 
Assembly directly, in an effort to overturn the Canon Laws prohibiting divorce.  In this tract, 
Milton’s evocation of natural law attempts to overturn a restrictive system of marriage that 
binds together couples without recourse. “In defending the right to divorce, Milton read in the 
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law of nature a strong protection of individual agency” (Komorowski 70).  Similar to his 
Reason of Church Government, Milton’s doctrine of natural law here argues for an external 
natural law that supersedes the positive governance of the Church of England.  Further 
removing natural law theory from the confines of a strictly philosophical and theological 
debate, in this publically published tract, Milton uses the theory of natural law to justify reform 
of Canon Law governing divorce.   
The basis for Milton’s natural law argument against Canon Law is grounded again in 
scriptural exegesis. The contemporary laws governing divorce ignored Moses’s allowance of 
marital separation in the Old Testament.  Milton observes that the positive law governing 
marriage is “crossing a law not only written by Moses, but characterized in us by nature, of more 
antiquity and deeper ground than marriage itself; which law is to force nothing against the 
faultless properties of nature” (Doctrine 867).  For Milton, upholding a positive Canon Law that 
disallows couples the right to divorce contradicts the properties of nature and is therefore 
contrary to natural law.  Milton observes, “law and nature are not to goe contrary…to forbid 
divorce compulsively, is not only against nature, but against law” (Doctrine 915).  Milton argues 
that this compulsivity, denying the right of separation for couples who are emotionally 
incompatible, is “striving vainly to glue an error together which God and nature will not…Nay, 
instead of being one flesh, they will be rather two carcasses chained unnaturally together” 
(Doctrine 878).  In Milton’s natural law theory here, the divine continues to play a central role.  
While previous theorists had not argued against the legalities of divorce, Milton’s divorce tract 
continues the author’s progressive movement towards liberation of the individual, inspired by the 
beliefs of early natural law theorists.  
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The roots of Milton’s natural law theory as articulated in Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce can be traced back very specifically to the work of Thomas Aquinas.  It was Aquinas 
who first conceived of a natural law founded in the divine providence of the Christian God.  In 
his divorce tract, Milton acknowledges that, “God indeed in some ways of his providence…hath 
plain enough revealed himself, and requires the observance thereof …to the lawe of nature and 
equity imprinted in us” (Doctrine 893).  Milton’s theory is predicated upon the fact that natural 
law is an inherent part of our being originating in the divine providence of God.  In the Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce, this familiar paradigm is set up as the rationale for a natural law 
governing the law of marriage.  In this way, Milton’s divorce tract “seems to agree with Aquinas 
on the central points of natural law” (White 217).  In Milton’s natural law argument, a Canon 
Law prohibiting divorce deceives reason and conscience, arbitrarily adhering to the positive law 
of custom.  As Milton states, though, “conscience in the plain demonstration of the spirit finds 
most evincing…for the most part that custom [Canon Law] still is silently received for the best 
instructor” (Doctrine 857).  Milton’s contribution to natural law theory continues to be his stamp 
of defiance that augments the work of earlier theorists. In borrowing from the teachings of the 
early church, Milton applies natural law theory in a way that was unthinkable to its original 
Christian theorists.  While their intention was to teach the importance of obeying the inborn 
conscience of God, Milton uses divine conscience to argue for reform of longstanding traditions 
and customs that hinged upon the liberties of the individual citizen. 
Nevertheless, in Doctrine of Discipline and Divorce, Milton’s natural law theory is also 
derivative of Grotius’s theory and its concerns with the law of charity.  In establishing the 
connection between natural law and the law of charity, Milton argues that the disavowal of 
divorce based on marital incompatibility would undermine a law of charity and espouse 
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sentiments of animosity among members in a community.  Therefore, a positive law upholding 
the prohibition of divorce is incongruent with the laws of nature as well as charity.  In Milton’s 
words, “I shall not much waver to affirm, that those words which are made to intimate, as if they 
forbad all divorce but for adultery… without care to preserve those fundamental and superior 
laws of nature and charity, to which all other ordinances give up their seals” (Doctrine 902).  
Milton deems the existing Canon Law an inferior ordinance to the superior natural law and its 
offspring, the law of charity. Milton has reasserted the hierarchy of law assumed in both 
Aristotle’s and Grotius’s works, placing natural law at the pinnacle of legal governance. Yet 
while Aristotle’s and Grotius’s works assert the hierarchy of natural law, these theorists both 
respect the standing law of the state and steer clear of direct subversive political impositions.  
Milton’s arguments for divorce push further, articulating a revolutionary theory that calls for 
other laws to “give up their seals” (902).     
In reading Milton’s divorce tract as a call for radical legal reform, the historical context 
of the document should be examined.  Even though the premise of Milton’s natural law 
argument is an appeal to overturn the positive law of the domestic citizen, there is an underlying 
subversive commentary aimed at the authority of the state.  Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce establishes the connection between the Canon Laws and the larger positive laws of the 
state, arguing that, “as a whole people is in proportion to an ill Government, so is one man to an 
ill marriage, he who marries, intends as little to conspire his own ruine” (Doctrine 862).  In 
analogizing the submission to the church law of marriage as an ill submission to the law of the 
state, Milton gestures to the radical potential of natural law theory in undermining the laws of 
the state.  Although Milton’s tract “has little connection with the Revolution, the 
arguments…are largely drawn from the rationale of the Revolution, and cannot be fully 
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understood apart from them” (Sirluck 2).   Sirluck here acknowledges the connection between 
Milton’s divorce tracts and the larger backdrop of the English Civil War.  In attacking the 
Canon Laws directly, and addressing the document to Parliament itself, Milton again creates a 
larger gap between the natural law philosophies of earlier theorists and his own, taking the 
debate into the realm of civil law. 
  
MILTON’S NATURAL LAW PART III: TENURE OF KINGS AND MAGISTRATES  
 
Moving beyond the domestic sphere, Milton’s natural law theory continues its primary 
concern with the liberty of the individual.  At the close of the Civil War, Milton’s prose writing 
turned to the political crisis.  His work in this period focuses on the governance of England.  In 
these works, Milton deviates dramatically from the conservative countenance of previous natural 
law theorists, articulating a pointed attack on the English monarchy.    
The libertarian ideas present in Milton’s political tract The Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates again draw upon Grotius’s work, particularly in the way in which its opening 
argumentation establishes the rationality of public governance through the institution of right 
reason.  The opening passage of his tract sets up the historic failure of citizenry to be ruled by 
right reason, with Milton inquiring:  
If men within themselves would be governed by reason, and not generally give up 
their understanding to a double tyranny, of custom from without, and blind 
affections within, they would discern better, what it is to favor and uphold the 
Tyrant of a Nation. But being slaves within doors, no wonder that they strive so 
much to have the public State conformably governed to the inward vicious rule, 
by which they govern themselves…Hence is it that tyrants are not often offended, 
nor stand much in doubt of bad men, as being all naturally servile. But in whom 
virtue and true worth is most eminent, them they fear in earnest.  (Tenure 1021) 
 
This passage assumes an inherent connection between the virtues and freedoms of the citizen and 
his/her innate ability to reason.  Milton argues that the decision to subject oneself to inequitable 
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governance is a testament to the intellectual failures of the individual citizen.  To be wise is 
equated here not only with liberty, but also with morality.  He presupposes again a division of 
citizenship between the virtuous and the naturally servile.  His argument in favor of the 
individual to choose its government hinges upon the intellectual ability of a citizenship elect and 
is determined in accordance with its tangible moral fiber.  This notion that the right reasoning 
process of these select citizens could facilitate the usurpation of a perceived tyrant is based on a 
sense of moral self-righteousness that would pointedly single out his opponents as not only 
irrational, but also impure. 
       The system of government here is not one of an external nature.  In Milton’s theory of 
natural law, government is founded in the internal justice of the individual and not the legality of 
the state.   Matthew W. Binney comments on this new hierarchical structure: 
Instead of appealing to an early western nature that underscores the external 
authority of the state’s or church’s hierarchy and telos, Milton offers a new 
nature, articulated with Puritan Ideals and Natural law rhetoric, that emphasizes 
people’s internal authority, justified by laws of nature, which places everyone 
within a higher, limitless moral community. (47) 
 
Absent from an external hierarchal structure, Milton’s conception of natural law allows for an 
inner authority of the selective citizen that takes precedence over positive, external law.  This 
higher, limitless moral community is in fact a community capable of self-regulation, as well as of 
determining the character of a larger body politic.  Contrary to earlier systems of governance, the 
positive law of an external authority is not permitted to supersede the internal ethics of a favored 
citizenship.  
       For Milton’s natural law theory in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates to be successful, the 
intellectual capability of the individual must be such that it is endowed with the ability to self-
govern.  In line with Grotius’s theories, this belief in an internal natural law has its origins in the 
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individual’s intellectual ability to reason rightly and justly.  This transfer of power intellectually 
and legislatively echoes a more modern sociopolitical notion of equality and liberty not 
acknowledged in Milton’s era.  Matthew Binney comments, “Milton’s early modern notion [of 
Natural law] underscores reason’s critical capacity to weigh, measure, and differentiate, so that 
citizens make choices that align, as we shall see, with the laws of nature…People do not receive 
injunctions of right or wrong action from an external earthly authority” (40).  Milton’s theory 
presumes that human beings are endowed with the ability to ascertain the laws of nature based on 
an inner sense of social justice and morality.  As such, Milton’s natural law theory envisions a 
citizenship with the intellectual capability to determine justice on an interpersonal level, resulting 
in the establishment of a just external governance.  The assumption here is that man as a rational 
creature is qualified to govern the self and by proxy the state.  In his Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates, Milton’s citizenship, free from the inherent moral trappings of a tyrannical 
government, can willfully and dutifully usurp a morally corrupt monarch.  
 Regarding an argument for communal governance, Milton’s natural law theory is 
derivative of Grotius.  As Grotius mentions, “for the very nature of man, which even if we had 
no lack of anything would lead us into the mutual relations of society, is the mother of the law of 
nature” (14).  Espousing these notions of a natural law that upholds the brotherhood of citizens, 
Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates elaborates,  
Who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and brother-hood between 
man and man over all the World, neither is it the English Sea that can sever us 
from that duty and relation: a straiter bond yet there is between fellow-subjects, 
neighbors and friends; but when any of these doe one to another so as hostility 
could doe no worse, what doth the Law decree less against them, than open 
enemies and invaders? Or if the law be not present, or too weak, what doth it 
warrant us to less then single defense or civil war?  And from that time forward 
the Law of civil defensive war, differs nothing from the Law of foreign hostility.  
        (Tenure 1035-1036) 
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In this passage, Milton sets up a parallel between foreign and inter-domestic hostilities and their 
threat to a nation.  To defend one’s community against an external threat is likened to the defense 
of the citizen against the injustice of a tyrannical king.  Both of these political scenarios threaten 
the natural bond that exists between man and nation.  The individual therefore has the right in 
both instances to sever this relationship.  Milton’s argument for liberty in the civil realm is also 
based on a popular natural law theory that was gaining public momentum at the onset of the mid 
seventeenth-century English Civil War. 
   
MILTON’S NATURAL LAW AND THE WORK OF THOMAS HOBBES 
           In his study of natural law, R.S. White suggests a distinct dividing line both theoretically 
and chronologically between John Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, written in 1649, 
and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, written in 1651.  Commenting on the relationship between 
these natural law theories, White observes that, “One small event in 1651 probably did more in 
the long run to eclipse Milton’s reputation and the traditional notion of natural law upon which 
he relied than did any institution such as kingship.  This was the publication of Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, a book that came to cast a shadow over post-restoration thought” (243).  As White’s 
narrative assumes, Hobbesian natural law theory contradicts many of the structural precepts of 
Milton’s political ideologies and ultimately works to undermine the poet/polemist’s notions of 
civil liberty.   
      Hobbes’s Leviathan directly challenges the assumptions of Milton’s natural law 
theory.  Commenting on the use of the term “conscience” in arguments that looked to natural law 
to justify rebellion against a monarch, Hobbes notices, 
men vehemently in love with their own opinions, (though never so absurd,) and 
obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that reverenced 
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name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak 
against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but 
that they think so. (244) 
 
 Milton’s theory on the innate virtue of natural law governance is influenced in many ways by 
Puritan notions of conscience.  According to Milton, this internal arbiter of justice allows the 
individual to differentiate between right and wrong and thus determines appropriate 
action.  Hobbes’s critique of conscience thereby speaks directly to The Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates.  Particularly at stake here is the assumption that each individual maintains an 
intellectually clear conscience with which to determine the just nature of laws within the political 
sphere. The Hobbesian critique illuminates the problematic nature of Milton’s formulation and 
the assumptions under which it ‘pretends to know’ the internal state of man.  
            In a sense, the assumption of a normative internal ‘conscience’ in Milton’s theory is a by-
product of his tendency to associate liberty with reason. It is the interaction between the two that 
allows an individual as a citizen of the state to challenge the governance of an absolute monarch. 
This notion of ‘reason’ leading to social justice and an equitable state is undermined by Hobbes’s 
narrative that altogether denies the idea of intellectual self-governance.  As such, Hobbes’s 
Leviathan inverts the relationship between individual liberty and natural law.  The citizen’s 
liberty here is upheld not by his/her ability to ascertain the moral implications of natural law, but 
instead by the civic restraints of an external legislature.  Hobbes comments that, “for the Laws of 
Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in sum) doing to others, as we would be done 
to [them]), of themselves, without terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are 
contrary to our natural Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like” (244).  
Contrary to Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, Hobbes’s theory of natural law leads him 
to argue for a strict enforcement of institutional power, and so Hobbes’s theory asserts that in 
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order to maintain civic order, a positive external law must restrain the passions and the liberty of 
the citizen. Interestingly, Hobbes no more dismisses the existence of a natural law governing 
morality than Milton himself; however, Hobbes’s natural law theory deviates in two critical ways 
from that of Milton.  It assumes first that man is naturally corrupt and incapable of self-
governance through internal reason alone, and second that the threat of terror by a monarch is 
integral to maintaining the moralities of natural law. 
           Hobbes envisions man as a primal being whose inclinations tend towards disunity and 
violence. As such, Hobbes assumes that the ‘natural’ state of man is separate from an existing, 
yet unattainable natural law of ethics.  White comments that, “Hobbes presupposes that although 
peace is paramount [to natural law], such a desire cannot be predisposed.  Rather, he argues that 
men will not be good to one another unless either it is in their own self-interests or they are 
compelled by a sovereign body to be so” (245).   
In Hobbesian theory, mankind does not possess an innate sense of sociability that drives 
him towards peace, but rather the tenets of a moral natural law are initiated only through the 
legal restrictions of a sovereign government.  Hobbes proclaims, “the Passions that incline men 
to Peace, are Fear of Death; and desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living” 
(245). The implication here is that communal peace is only attainable through the authority of an 
external institution with the power to promote or punish.  According to Hobbes, natural law 
places an emphasis on rewards and demerits, rather than on reason and virtue. 
            In order to create this distinction between primordial man and the power of the state, 
Hobbes’s theory distinguishes between the innate natural rights of the citizen and the natural law 
of the government.  White explains: 
In his discussion [on law], Hobbes sharply reproves those who in his view 
confuse natural rights (Jus Naturale) and natural law (Lex Naturalis).  The  former 
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he squarely defines in individualistic terms as ‘the liberty each man hath, to use 
his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature.  Natural 
law on the other hand, is a limitation on liberty, because it determines what cannot 
be done and binds men to its terms as an obligation. (245) 
 
The Hobbesian theory of natural law assumes that external sovereignty is natural and itself 
upholds the law, while liberty for the citizen is limited strictly to the private life of the individual 
and limited largely to self-defense or preservation.  The distinction between the terms natural law 
and natural right allow for a separation between individual will and civil liberty.  As such, in Jus 
Naturale, the citizen is allowed the liberty to function in accordance with his inner need for self-
preservation, so long as he does not subvert an externally enforced law.  
According to Hobbes, the individual citizen is prone not only to insubordination, but also 
more conspicuously to the corruption of social justice.  This separation of the citizen from his/her 
conscience creates a similar ethical divide within the institution of the state as well.  White 
acknowledges that “Hobbes has been seen, rightly or wrongly, as the grandfather of the politics 
of political materialism and pragmatism, the economy of market forces, [and] of possessive 
individualism” (243). Similarly, Catherine Gimelli Martin observes: 
Nevertheless, Hobbesian political science was to triumph not merely during the 
short run of the Restoration but also in the long run of modern constitutional 
democracy.  Although the modern state is hardly the monolith much less the 
monarchy that Hobbes envisioned, his stringent separation of religious from 
political thought proved so pragmatically and ethically viable that, in fact, it also 
seems to provide an important factor [in modern politics]. (247) 
 
These scholars are interpreting the separation of conscience from natural law in the Hobbesian 
dialectic as a forerunner to a modern politic in which individual conscience is often 
circumvented in favor of civic order, resulting in pragmatic policies over more challenging 
ethical politics.  
 In examining the seventeenth-century natural law theorists, the antithetical relationship 
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between Hobbes and his theoretical opponents, Milton and Grotius, mimics the contemporary 
political arena where ethical considerations on issues from immigration to finance are often at 
odds with the custom and traditions of state law.  While ‘natural law’ may seem antiquated, 
certainly in light of its medieval contextualization here, the tension between the positive law of 
the state and the moral liberties of the individual are a sociopolitical constant throughout history.  
Certainly, the natural law theories discussed here from Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas 
Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, and John Milton, have played a major role in determining the 
fundamental structure of that argument.   
 
PARADISE LOST: A FINAL WORD 
While a detailed analysis of Milton’s poetry is beyond the scope of this examination, the 
poet/polemist’s work in Paradise Lost is in many ways a “fictional expression of the same ideas” 
(White 237) we find in Milton’s political prose and parliamentary addresses. It is fair to assume 
that Milton’s natural law inflected poetry is, in part, an allegorical response to the failure of the 
English Civil War and the 1660 Restoration of Charles II.  Subsequent to these events, any 
articulation of Milton’s natural law theory in political prose would very likely “not be published 
and thus not be read” (White 237) due to the re-imposition of strict licensing laws.  However, 
tucked away in a narrative retelling of the Biblical book of Genesis, Milton’s theory of natural 
law is free to live on.   
Briefly examining Milton’s characterizations in Paradise Lost, the depiction of God as 
arbiter of reason who will “place within them as a guide/my umpire conscience” (iii 194-195), 
versus Satan as ruler who in “transcendent glory raised/Above his fellows, with monarchial 
pride” (ii, 427-428), can be read through a new critical lens as an extension of the poet’s natural 
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law theory.  This poetic imaging of Milton’s natural law theory is in many ways a continuation 
of the artist’s dialogue with Hobbes, Grotius, and Aquinas.  Book xii of the poem reinforces 
Milton’s belief in mankind’s ability to intellectually grasp the tenets of natural law:  
but from Heav’n 
He to his own a Comforter will send,  
The promise of the Father, who shall dwell,  
His Spirit, within them, and the law of faith 
Working through love, upon their hearts shall write,  
To guide them in all truth, and also arm  
With Spiritual armour... (xii, 485-91) 
 
The poem here contends that the divine presence within the individual guides him or her towards 
the attainment of truth and love.  Thus, within Milton’s passage is an argument for the existence 
of an innately virtuous citizenry.  Quite a distance from the work of Hobbes who proclaimed “the 
Passions that incline men to Peace, are Fear of Death; and desire of such things as are necessary 
to commodious living” (245). It is even a great distance from Milton’s earlier works which 
depict the spirit of virtue and natural law as prizes awarded to a privileged few.  This later 
incantation of natural law seems to be most closely aligned with Aquinas who felt that “the 
rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way…Wherefore it has a 
share of the Eternal Reason” (1823).  The passage neatly connects to the arguments for liberty 
found in Milton’s prose works that depict a virtuous citizenship under the rule of an oppressive 
and tyrannous positive law doctrine. Revisiting these passages subsequent to this discussion on 
natural law allows for a new and different interpretation of Milton’s Paradise Lost and 
influences a reexamination of the poem under the critical lens of natural law theory.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  Historically the theory of natural law has had a powerful influence on western politics in 
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the years following Milton’s work. Representing the repressed liberty of the individual, Milton’s 
arguments, in his anti-Episcopal tracts, his divorce tracts, and his regicide tracts, serve as a 
prophetic step forward in the development of several sociopolitical movements: the separation 
between church and state, the reformation of divorce law, and the destabilization of monarchal 
governance, respectively.  In each of these instances, Milton challenges the cultural traditions of 
state law and argues for positive law based on innate moral reasoning.  To understand Milton’s 
work apart from his early influences—Grotius, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas—is to miss a 
fundamental component of his literature. Furthermore, to leave Milton out of the history of 
political natural law theory, as is often done, is to ignore a key figure in the development of the 
philosophy.  As such, the poet/polemist’s loquacious and assertive manner not only paved the 
way for a political progression in modern day civil liberties, but also represented an important 
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